Experimental results on the centipede game in normal form: an investigation on learning
Journal of Mathematical Psychology - Special issue on experimental economics
Regret minimizing equilibria and mechanisms for games with strict type uncertainty
UAI '04 Proceedings of the 20th conference on Uncertainty in artificial intelligence
Iterated regret minimization in game graphs
MFCS'10 Proceedings of the 35th international conference on Mathematical foundations of computer science
Beyond nash equilibrium: solution concepts for the 21st century
GameSec'11 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security
On Finding and Learning Effective Strategies for Complex Non-zero-sum Repeated Games
WI-IAT '12 Proceedings of the The 2012 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Joint Conferences on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology - Volume 02
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For some well-known games, such as the Traveler's Dilemma or the Centipede Game, traditional game-theoretic solution concepts--most notably Nash equilibrium--predict outcomes that are not consistent with empirical observations. We introduce a new solution concept, iterated regret minimization, which exhibits the same qualitative behavior as that observed in experiments in many games of interest, including Traveler's Dilemma, the Centipede Game, Nash bargaining, and Bertrand competition. As the name suggests, iterated regret minimization involves the iterated deletion of strategies that do not minimize regret.