Distributed Artificial Intelligence
Distributed Artificial Intelligence
Organizational abstractions for the analysis and design of multi-agent system
First international workshop, AOSE 2000 on Agent-oriented software engineering
Trust and deception in virtual societies
Trust and deception in virtual societies
Rational Communication in Multi-Agent Environments
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Organizations and Normative Agents
EurAsia-ICT '02 Proceedings of the First EurAsian Conference on Information and Communication Technology
Defining and Using Ideal Teammate and Opponent Agent Models
Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Twelfth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence
Multi-Agent Multi-User Modeling in I-Help
User Modeling and User-Adapted Interaction
Near-optimal network design with selfish agents
Proceedings of the thirty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Proceedings of the 9th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
A survey of multi-agent organizational paradigms
The Knowledge Engineering Review
The Role of Trust and Deception in Virtual Societies
International Journal of Electronic Commerce
The Contract Net Protocol: High-Level Communication and Control in a Distributed Problem Solver
IEEE Transactions on Computers
Algorithms for selfish agents mechanism design for distributed computation
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
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In hierarchical organisations, a preferred outcome is to promote a more productive worker to a more influential status. However, productivity is rarely directly measurable, so an individual worker often has both motive and opportunity to misrepresent his productivity. This leads to an alternative possibility: the promotion of selfish individuals. We use an agent-based model to study how selfishness and competency of agents influence their promotion in hierarchical organisations. We consider the case where selfish agents can overstate their productivity and thus obtain undeserved promotions. Our results suggest that more productive agents reach positions of power most of the time. However, even under ideal conditions, selfish agents occasionally dominate the higher levels of a hierarchical organisation, which in turn has a dramatic effect on all lower levels. For organisations of around 100-10,000 employees with 3-4 hierarchy levels, on average, the promotion of selfish agents is minimized and the promotion of competent agents is maximized. Finally, we show that judging the productivity of an individual agent has a greater impact on promoting selfish behaviour than judging the productivity of an individual's team. These results illustrate that agent-based models provide a powerful framework for examining how local interactions contribute to the large-scale properties of multi-layered organisations.