Mobile values, new names, and secure communication
POPL '01 Proceedings of the 28th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
Location Privacy in Pervasive Computing
IEEE Pervasive Computing
ESORICS '96 Proceedings of the 4th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security: Computer Security
The security of vehicular ad hoc networks
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM workshop on Security of ad hoc and sensor networks
Verifying privacy-type properties of electronic voting protocols
Journal of Computer Security
On the effectiveness of changing pseudonyms to provide location privacy in VANETS
ESAS'07 Proceedings of the 4th European conference on Security and privacy in ad-hoc and sensor networks
Untraceability of RFID protocols
WISTP'08 Proceedings of the 2nd IFIP WG 11.2 international conference on Information security theory and practices: smart devices, convergence and next generation networks
Formal Verification of Privacy for RFID Systems
CSF '10 Proceedings of the 2010 23rd IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
Analysing Unlinkability and Anonymity Using the Applied Pi Calculus
CSF '10 Proceedings of the 2010 23rd IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
Privacy issues in vehicular ad hoc networks
PET'05 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
A survey on privacy problems and solutions for VANET based on network model
ICA3PP'11 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Algorithms and architectures for parallel processing - Volume Part II
Formal analysis of privacy for anonymous location based services
TOSCA'11 Proceedings of the 2011 international conference on Theory of Security and Applications
Automated verification of equivalence properties of cryptographic protocols
ESOP'12 Proceedings of the 21st European conference on Programming Languages and Systems
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Safety critical applications for recently proposed vehicle to vehicle ad-hoc networks (VANETs) rely on a beacon signal, which poses a threat to privacy since it could allow a vehicle to be tracked. Mix-zones, where vehicles encrypt their transmissions and then change their identifiers, have been proposed as a solution to this problem. In this work, we describe a formal analysis of mix-zones. We model a mix-zone and propose a formal definition of privacy for such a zone. We give a set of necessary conditions for any mix-zone protocol to preserve privacy. We analyse, using the tool ProVerif, a particular proposal for key distribution in mix-zones, the CMIX protocol. We show that in many scenarios it does not preserve privacy, and we propose a fix.