A calculus for cryptographic protocols: the spi calculus
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Mobile values, new names, and secure communication
POPL '01 Proceedings of the 28th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
Foundations of Cryptography: Basic Tools
Foundations of Cryptography: Basic Tools
A Calculus of Communicating Systems
A Calculus of Communicating Systems
VITP: an information transfer protocol for vehicular computing
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM international workshop on Vehicular ad hoc networks
SP '08 Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
A Method for Proving Observational Equivalence
CSF '09 Proceedings of the 2009 22nd IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
Formal Verification of Privacy for RFID Systems
CSF '10 Proceedings of the 2010 23rd IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
Analysing Unlinkability and Anonymity Using the Applied Pi Calculus
CSF '10 Proceedings of the 2010 23rd IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
VPriv: protecting privacy in location-based vehicular services
SSYM'09 Proceedings of the 18th conference on USENIX security symposium
Formal analysis of privacy for vehicular mix-zones
ESORICS'10 Proceedings of the 15th European conference on Research in computer security
Analysis of an electronic voting protocol in the applied pi calculus
ESOP'05 Proceedings of the 14th European conference on Programming Languages and Systems
PPREM: Privacy Preserving REvocation Mechanism for Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks
Computer Standards & Interfaces
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We propose a framework for formal analysis of privacy in location based services such as anonymous electronic toll collection. We give a formal definition of privacy, and apply it to the VPriv scheme for vehicular services. We analyse the resulting model using the ProVerif tool, concluding that our privacy property holds only if certain conditions are met by the implementation. Our analysis includes some novel features such as the formal modelling of privacy for a protocol that relies on interactive zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge and list permutations.