Playing extensive form games in parallel

Authors:
Sujata Ghosh;R. Ramanujam;Sunil Simon
Affiliations:
Department of Artificial Intelligence, University of Groningen;The Institute of Mathematical Sciences, Chennai, India;Institute for Logic, Language and Computation, University of Amsterdam
Venue:
CLIMA'10 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Computational logic in multi-agent systems
Year:
2010

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Abstract

Consider a player playing against different opponents in two extensive form games simultaneously. Can she then have a strategy in one game using information from the other? The famous example of playing chess against two grandmasters simultaneously illustrates such reasoning. We consider a simple dynamic logic of extensive form games with sequential and parallel composition in which such situations can be expressed. We present a complete axiomatization and show that the satisfiability problem for the logic is decidable.