A Sense of Self for Unix Processes
SP '96 Proceedings of the 1996 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Rootkits: Subverting the Windows Kernel
Rootkits: Subverting the Windows Kernel
Pioneer: verifying code integrity and enforcing untampered code execution on legacy systems
Proceedings of the twentieth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles
SubVirt: Implementing malware with virtual machines
SP '06 Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Virtual Machines: Versatile Platforms for Systems and Processes (The Morgan Kaufmann Series in Computer Architecture and Design)
SecVisor: a tiny hypervisor to provide lifetime kernel code integrity for commodity OSes
Proceedings of twenty-first ACM SIGOPS symposium on Operating systems principles
IEEE Security and Privacy
Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Architectural support for programming languages and operating systems
Flicker: an execution infrastructure for tcb minimization
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM SIGOPS/EuroSys European Conference on Computer Systems 2008
Lares: An Architecture for Secure Active Monitoring Using Virtualization
SP '08 Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Guest-Transparent Prevention of Kernel Rootkits with VMM-Based Memory Shadowing
RAID '08 Proceedings of the 11th international symposium on Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection
Ether: malware analysis via hardware virtualization extensions
Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Dynamics of a Trusted Platform: A Building Block Approach
Dynamics of a Trusted Platform: A Building Block Approach
Secure in-VM monitoring using hardware virtualization
Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
"Out-of-the-Box" monitoring of VM-based high-interaction honeypots
RAID'07 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Recent advances in intrusion detection
Conqueror: tamper-proof code execution on legacy systems
DIMVA'10 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Detection of intrusions and malware, and vulnerability assessment
Nitro: hardware-based system call tracing for virtual machines
IWSEC'11 Proceedings of the 6th International conference on Advances in information and computer security
Vis: virtualization enhanced live acquisition for native system
Proceedings of the Second Asia-Pacific Workshop on Systems
A universal semantic bridge for virtual machine introspection
ICISS'11 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Information Systems Security
When hardware meets software: a bulletproof solution to forensic memory acquisition
Proceedings of the 28th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
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We present HyperSleuth, a framework that leverages the virtualization extensions provided by commodity hardware to securely perform live forensic analysis of potentially compromised production systems. HyperSleuth provides a trusted execution environment that guarantees four fundamental properties. First, an attacker controlling the system cannot interfere with the analysis and cannot tamper the results. Second, the framework can be installed as the system runs, without a reboot and without loosing any volatile data. Third, the analysis performed is completely transparent to the OS and to an attacker. Finally, the analysis can be periodically and safely interrupted to resume normal execution of the system. On top of HyperSleuth we implemented three forensic analysis applications: a lazy physical memory dumper, a lie detector, and a system call tracer. The experimental evaluation we conducted demonstrated that even time consuming analysis, such as the dump of the content of the physical memory, can be securely performed without interrupting the services offered by the system.