Random Key Predistribution Schemes for Sensor Networks
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Range-free localization schemes for large scale sensor networks
Proceedings of the 9th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
Secure verification of location claims
WiSe '03 Proceedings of the 2nd ACM workshop on Wireless security
The sybil attack in sensor networks: analysis & defenses
Proceedings of the 3rd international symposium on Information processing in sensor networks
SeRLoc: secure range-independent localization for wireless sensor networks
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM workshop on Wireless security
Robust statistical methods for securing wireless localization in sensor networks
IPSN '05 Proceedings of the 4th international symposium on Information processing in sensor networks
Attack-resistant location estimation in sensor networks
IPSN '05 Proceedings of the 4th international symposium on Information processing in sensor networks
ROPE: robust position estimation in wireless sensor networks
IPSN '05 Proceedings of the 4th international symposium on Information processing in sensor networks
On the interaction between localization and location verification for wireless sensor networks
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
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Localization plays an important role in wireless sensor networks, since sensors need to associate their readings with location in order to deliver meaningful information. A promising approach to enhance the robustness and the security of localization is location verification, where the objective is to verify a node's claimed location. In this paper, we propose a new location verification protocol, where verifier nodes vary their communication range in order to triangulate the position of a node. We first present the network model and our assumptions, followed by a detailed description of the protocol. Next, a security analysis is provided which shows that the new approach is robust against several location spoofing attacks. Moreover, we derive both analytical and simulation results for the coverage probability and show that a high coverage probability can be achieved with the new protocol, even with a relatively low density of verifier nodes. Finally, we study the impact of localization error on the verification probability and demonstrate that the protocol is sensitive enough to detect small deviations between claimed and actual locations.