Cujo: efficient detection and prevention of drive-by-download attacks

  • Authors:
  • Konrad Rieck;Tammo Krueger;Andreas Dewald

  • Affiliations:
  • Technische Universität Berlin, Germany;Fraunhofer Institute FIRST, Germany;University of Mannheim, Germany

  • Venue:
  • Proceedings of the 26th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
  • Year:
  • 2010

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Abstract

The JavaScript language is a core component of active and dynamic web content in the Internet today. Besides its great success in enhancing web applications, however, JavaScript provides the basis for so-called drive-by downloads---attacks exploiting vulnerabilities in web browsers and their extensions for unnoticeably downloading malicious software. Due to the diversity and frequent use of obfuscation in these attacks, static code analysis is largely ineffective in practice. While dynamic analysis and honeypots provide means to identify drive-by-download attacks, current approaches induce a significant overhead which renders immediate prevention of attacks intractable. In this paper, we present Cujo, a system for automatic detection and prevention of drive-by-download attacks. Embedded in a web proxy, Cujo transparently inspects web pages and blocks delivery of malicious JavaScript code. Static and dynamic code features are extracted on-the-fly and analysed for malicious patterns using efficient techniques of machine learning. We demonstrate the efficacy of Cujo in different experiments, where it detects 94% of the drive-by downloads with few false alarms and a median run-time of 500 ms per web page---a quality that, to the best of our knowledge, has not been attained in previous work on detection of drive-by-download attacks.