Proceedings of the 18th international conference on World wide web
Towards Achieving Personalized Privacy for Location-Based Services
Transactions on Data Privacy
A survey of computational location privacy
Personal and Ubiquitous Computing
Moving beyond untagging: photo privacy in a tagged world
Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems
Louis, Lester and Pierre: three protocols for location privacy
PET'07 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Achieving efficient query privacy for location based services
PETS'10 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Multimodal location estimation on Flickr videos
WSM '11 Proceedings of the 3rd ACM SIGMM international workshop on Social media
Sherlock holmes' evil twin: on the impact of global inference for online privacy
Proceedings of the 2011 workshop on New security paradigms workshop
Children and geotagged images: quantitative analysis for security risk assessment
International Journal of Electronic Security and Digital Forensics
Evaluating the privacy risk of location-based services
FC'11 Proceedings of the 15th international conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
Exploiting innocuous activity for correlating users across sites
Proceedings of the 22nd international conference on World Wide Web
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
This article aims to raise awareness of a rapidly emerging privacy threat that we term cybercasing: using geo-tagged information available online to mount real-world attacks. While users typically realize that sharing locations has some implications for their privacy, we provide evidence that many (i) are unaware of the full scope of the threat they face when doing so, and (ii) often do not even realize when they publish such information. The threat is elevated by recent developments that make systematic search for specific geo-located data and inference from multiple sources easier than ever before. In this paper, we summarize the state of geo-tagging; estimate the amount of geo-information available on several major sites, including YouTube, Twitter, and Craigslist; and examine its programmatic accessibility through public APIs. We then present a set of scenarios demonstrating how easy it is to correlate geotagged data with corresponding publicly-available information for compromising a victim's privacy. We were, e.g., able to find private addresses of celebrities as well as the origins of otherwise anonymized Craigslist postings. We argue that the security and privacy community needs to shape the further development of geo-location technology for better protecting users from such consequences.