Distinguishers for the compression function and output transformation of hamsi-256

  • Authors:
  • Jean-Philippe Aumasson;Emilia Käsper;Lars Ramkilde Knudsen;Krystian Matusiewicz;Rune Ødegård;Thomas Peyrin;Martin Schläffer

  • Affiliations:
  • Nagravision SA, Cheseaux, Switzerland;Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, ESAT-COSIC, Belgium;Department of Mathematics, Technical University of Denmark;Institute of Mathematics and Computer Science, Wroclaw University of Technology;Centre for Quantifiable Quality of Service in Communication Systems, Norwegian University of Science and Technology;Ingenico, France;IAIK, TU Graz, Austria

  • Venue:
  • ACISP'10 Proceedings of the 15th Australasian conference on Information security and privacy
  • Year:
  • 2010

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Abstract

Hamsi is one of 14 remaining candidates in NIST's Hash Competition for the future hash standard SHA-3. Until now, little analysis has been published on its resistance to differential cryptanalysis, the main technique used to attack hash functions. We present a study of Hamsi's resistance to differential and higher-order differential cryptanalysis, with focus on the 256-bit version of Hamsi. Our main results are efficient distinguishers and near-collisions for its full (3-round) compression function, and distinguishers for its full (6-round) finalization function, indicating that Hamsi's building blocks do not behave ideally.