Representation results for defeasible logic
ACM Transactions on Computational Logic (TOCL)
Revising Nonmonotonic Theories: The Case of Defeasible Logic
KI '99 Proceedings of the 23rd Annual German Conference on Artificial Intelligence: Advances in Artificial Intelligence
Fulfilling or Violating Obligations in Normative Multiagent Systems
IAT '04 Proceedings of the IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Intelligent Agent Technology
Argumentation Semantics for Defeasible Logic
Journal of Logic and Computation
Temporalised normative positions in defeasible logic
ICAIL '05 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Artificial intelligence and law
Fundamental legal concepts: a formal and teleological characterisation
Artificial Intelligence and Law
Introduction to the special issue on normative multiagent systems
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
BIO logical agents: Norms, beliefs, intentions in defeasible logic
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
A computational framework for institutional agency
Artificial Intelligence and Law
Superiority based revision of defeasible theories
RuleML'10 Proceedings of the 2010 international conference on Semantic web rules
Normative systems represented as hybrid knowledge bases
CLIMA'11 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Computational logic in multi-agent systems
Open issues for normative multi-agent systems
AI Communications
Capturing variability of law with nómos 2
ER'12 Proceedings of the 31st international conference on Conceptual Modeling
A deontic logic semantics for licenses composition in the web of data
Proceedings of the Fourteenth International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law
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This paper argues in favour of the necessity of dynamically restricting and expanding the applicability of norms regulating computer systems like multiagent systems, in situations where the compliance to the norm does not achieve the purpose of the norm. We propose a logical framework which distinguishes between constitutive and regulative norms and captures the norm change power and at the same time the limitations of the judicial system in dynamically revising the set of constitutive rules defining the concepts on which the applicability of norms is based. In particular, the framework is used to reconstruct some interpretive arguments described in legal theory such as those corresponding to the Roman maxims lex minus dixit quam voluit and lex magis dixit quam voluit. The logical framework is based on an extension of defeasible logic.