Nash equilibria in fisher market

Authors:
Bharat Adsul;Ch. Sobhan Babu;Jugal Garg;Ruta Mehta;Milind Sohoni
Affiliations:
Indian Institute of Technology, Bombay;Indian Institute of Technology, Hyderabad;Indian Institute of Technology, Bombay;Indian Institute of Technology, Bombay;Indian Institute of Technology, Bombay
Venue:
SAGT'10 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Algorithmic game theory
Year:
2010

Citing 7
Cited 2

A Polynomial Time Algorithm for Computing the Arrow-Debreu Market Equilibrium for Linear Utilities

FOCS '04 Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
On the polynomial time computation of equilibria for certain exchange economies

SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Algorithmic Game Theory

Algorithmic Game Theory
Forward looking Nash equilibrium for keyword auction

Information Processing Letters
Market equilibrium via a primal--dual algorithm for a convex program

Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Improved algorithms for computing fisher's market clearing prices: computing fisher's market clearing prices

Proceedings of the forty-second ACM symposium on Theory of computing
New results on rationality and strongly polynomial time solvability in eisenberg-gale markets

WINE'06 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Internet and Network Economics

How profitable are strategic behaviors in a market?

ESA'11 Proceedings of the 19th European conference on Algorithms
Incentive ratios of fisher markets

ICALP'12 Proceedings of the 39th international colloquium conference on Automata, Languages, and Programming - Volume Part II

Quantified Score

Hi-index	0.00

Visualization

Abstract

Much work has been done on the computation of market equilibria. However due to strategic play by buyers, it is not clear whether these are actually observed in the market. Motivated by the observation that a buyer may derive a better payoff by feigning a different utility function and thereby manipulating the Fisher market equilibrium, we formulate the Fisher market game in which buyers strategize by posing different utility functions. We show that existence of a conflict-free allocation is a necessary condition for the Nash equilibria (NE) and also sufficient for the symmetric NE in this game. There are many NE with very different payoffs, and the Fisher equilibrium payoff is captured at a symmetric NE. We provide a complete polyhedral characterization of all the NE for the two-buyer market game. Surprisingly, all the NE of this game turn out to be symmetric and the corresponding payoffs constitute a piecewise linear concave curve. We also study the correlated equilibria of this game and show that third-party mediation does not help to achieve a better payoff than NE payoffs.