TinyPBC: Pairings for authenticated identity-based non-interactive key distribution in sensor networks

  • Authors:
  • Leonardo B. Oliveira;Diego F. Aranha;Conrado P. L. Gouvêa;Michael Scott;Danilo F. Címara;Julio López;Ricardo Dahab

  • Affiliations:
  • Faculty of Technology, UNICAMP, Limeira, SP, CEP 13484-332, Brazil;Institute of Computing, UNICAMP, Campinas, SP, CEP 13083-970, Brazil;Institute of Computing, UNICAMP, Campinas, SP, CEP 13083-970, Brazil;School of Computing, Dublin City University, Glasnevin, Dublin 9, Ireland;Institute of Computing, UNICAMP, Campinas, SP, CEP 13083-970, Brazil;Institute of Computing, UNICAMP, Campinas, SP, CEP 13083-970, Brazil;Institute of Computing, UNICAMP, Campinas, SP, CEP 13083-970, Brazil

  • Venue:
  • Computer Communications
  • Year:
  • 2011

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Abstract

Key distribution in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) is challenging. Symmetric cryptosystems can perform it efficiently, but they often do not provide a perfect trade-off between resilience and storage. Further, even though conventional public key and elliptic curve cryptosystems are computationally feasible on sensor nodes, protocols based on them are not, as they require the exchange and storage of large keys and certificates, which is expensive. Using Pairing-Based Cryptography (PBC) protocols parties can agree on keys without any interaction. In this work, we (i) show how security in WSNs can be bootstrapped using an authenticated identity-based non-interactive protocol and (ii) present TinyPBC, to our knowledge, the most efficient implementation of PBC primitives for 8, 16 and 32-bit processors commonly found in sensor nodes. TinyPBC is able to compute pairings, the most expensive primitive of PBC, in 1.90s on ATmega128L, 1.27s on MSP430 and 0.14s on PXA27x.