A first-order leak-free masking countermeasure
CT-RSA'12 Proceedings of the 12th conference on Topics in Cryptology
Optimal first-order masking with linear and non-linear bijections
AFRICACRYPT'12 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Cryptology in Africa
From Cryptography to Hardware: Analyzing Embedded Xilinx BRAM for Cryptographic Applications
MICROW '12 Proceedings of the 2012 45th Annual IEEE/ACM International Symposium on Microarchitecture Workshops
A programmable look-up table-based interpolator with nonuniform sampling scheme
International Journal of Reconfigurable Computing
RSM: a small and fast countermeasure for AES, secure against 1st and 2nd-order zero-offset SCAs
DATE '12 Proceedings of the Conference on Design, Automation and Test in Europe
On measurable side-channel leaks inside ASIC design primitives
CHES'13 Proceedings of the 15th international conference on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Hi-index | 0.00 |
Security at low cost is an important factor for cryptographic hardware implementations. Unfortunately, the security of cryptographic implementations is threatened by Side Channel Analysis (SCA). SCA attempts to discover the secret key of a device by exploiting implementation characteristics and bypassing the algorithm's mathematical security. Differential Power Analysis (DPA) is a type of SCA, which exploits the device's power consumption characteristics. Several countermeasures to DPA have been proposed, however, all of them increase security at the cost of increased area which in-turn leads to increased power consumption and reduced throughput. FPGAs are popular due to their reconfigurability, lower development cost, off-the-shelf availability and shorter time to market. Block RAMs (BRAM) are large memories in FPGAs that are commonly used as ROM, FIFO, Look-up tables, etc. In this paper we explore the DPA resistance of BRAMs in Xilinx FPGAs and verify if their usage can improve the security. The results of our Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) implementations show that using BRAMs alone can improve the security over a look-up table (LUT) only design 9 times. Applying Separated Dynamic Differential Logic (SDDL) for FPGAs, a countermeasure against DPA, to this design doubles the security again leading to an 18 fold increase over the unprotected LUT design.