Rules are objects too: A knowledge model for an active, object-oriented databasesystem
Lecture notes in computer science on Advances in object-oriented database systems
Modern database systems
The B-book: assigning programs to meanings
The B-book: assigning programs to meanings
Answering queries without revealing secrets
ACM Transactions on Database Systems (TODS)
Data & Knowledge Engineering
Formal Characterizations of Active Databases: Part II
DOOD '97 Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Deductive and Object-Oriented Databases
The Active Database Management System Manifesto: A Rulebase of ADBMS Features
RIDS '95 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Rules in Database Systems
Confidentiality Policies and Their Enforcement for Controlled Query Evaluation
ESORICS '02 Proceedings of the 7th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security
Database Security-Concepts, Approaches, and Challenges
IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
ProB: an automated analysis toolset for the B method
International Journal on Software Tools for Technology Transfer (STTT)
Modeling and Controlling Downgrading Operations in Information Systems
SITIS '09 Proceedings of the 2009 Fifth International Conference on Signal Image Technology and Internet Based Systems
Enforcing confidentiality in relational databases by reducing inference control to access control
ISC'07 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Information Security
Consistency policies for dynamic information systems with declassification flows
ICISS'11 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Information Systems Security
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
Many research works focused on modeling relational database management systems (DBMS) that support multilevel security (MLS) policies. However, most of these previous proposals only consider static aspects of relational databases and do not address dynamicity provided by mechanisms like triggers. Since such mechanisms introduced specific security problems, in particular they create new information flows, it is necessary to extend traditional MLS models designed for relational databases to handle these problems. However, it has been shown in many papers that triggers lack a formal model to support them and so they are not free of ambiguities. To address these theoretical limitations of trigger, our work is based on a formal model that applies MLS policies to active databases. Active databases provide a more expressive and formal framework than triggers. In this paper, we first define an information flow model for active databases. Based on this security model, we then present security requirements that are sufficient to prevent illegal information flows and prove them using the B method.