A comment on the `basic security theorem' of Bell and LaPadula
Information Processing Letters
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
A taxonomy for secure object-oriented databases
ACM Transactions on Database Systems (TODS)
Minimal data upgrading to prevent inference and association attacks
PODS '99 Proceedings of the eighteenth ACM SIGMOD-SIGACT-SIGART symposium on Principles of database systems
Logical foundations of multilevel databases
Data & Knowledge Engineering
Answering queries without revealing secrets
ACM Transactions on Database Systems (TODS)
For unknown secrecies refusal is better than lying
Data & Knowledge Engineering
Data & Knowledge Engineering
Lying versus refusal for known potential secrets
Data Engineering
Foundations of Databases: The Logical Level
Foundations of Databases: The Logical Level
Lattice-Based Access Control Models
Computer
Foundations of Secure Deductive Databases
IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering
Secure Databases: Constraints, Inference Channels, and Monitoring Disclosures
IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering
A Multilevel Security Model for Distributed Object Systems
ESORICS '96 Proceedings of the 4th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security: Computer Security
Confidentiality Policies and Their Enforcement for Controlled Query Evaluation
ESORICS '02 Proceedings of the 7th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security
The inference problem: a survey
ACM SIGKDD Explorations Newsletter
Access control in a relational data base management system by query modification
ACM '74 Proceedings of the 1974 annual conference - Volume 1
Controlled Query Evaluation for Known Policies by Combining Lying and Refusal
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Extending query rewriting techniques for fine-grained access control
SIGMOD '04 Proceedings of the 2004 ACM SIGMOD international conference on Management of data
Computer Security 2e
Database Security-Concepts, Approaches, and Challenges
IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Information and Software Technology
Controlled query evaluation with open queries for a decidable relational submodel
FoIKS'06 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Foundations of Information and Knowledge Systems
Combining fragmentation and encryption to protect privacy in data storage
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
A framework to enforce access control over data streams
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Efficient inference control for open relational queries
DBSec'10 Proceedings of the 24th annual IFIP WG 11.3 working conference on Data and applications security and privacy
Expression and enforcement of confidentiality policy in active databases
Proceedings of the International Conference on Management of Emergent Digital EcoSystems
DNIS'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Databases in Networked Information Systems
Towards controlled query evaluation for incomplete first-order databases
FoIKS'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Foundations of Information and Knowledge Systems
Inference-usability confinement by maintaining inference-proof views of an information system
International Journal of Computational Science and Engineering
An OBDD approach to enforce confidentiality and visibility constraints in data publishing
Journal of Computer Security - DBSec 2011
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
Security in relational database systems pursues two conflicting interests: confidentiality and availability. In order to effect a compromise between these interests, two techniques have evolved. On the one hand, controlled query evaluation always preserves confidentiality, but leads to undecidable inference problems in general. On the other hand, access control features simple access decisions, but possibly cannot avoid unwanted information flows. This paper introduces a form of access control that, in combination with restricting the query language, results in an efficient access control mechanism under preservation of confidentiality. Moreover, we justify the necessity of our restrictions and give an outlook on how to use our result as building block for a less restrictive but still secure system.