The dining cryptographers problem: unconditional sender and recipient untraceability
Journal of Cryptology
Crowds: anonymity for Web transactions
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Hordes: a multicast based protocol for anonymity
Journal of Computer Security
Shake them up!: a movement-based pairing protocol for CPU-constrained devices
Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Mobile systems, applications, and services
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
Noisy tags: a pretty good key exchange protocol for RFID tags
CARDIS'06 Proceedings of the 7th IFIP WG 8.8/11.2 international conference on Smart Card Research and Advanced Applications
Anonymous connections and onion routing
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Hi-index | 0.00 |
This position paper proposes the use of special broadcast networks to achieve provable and measurable confidentiality of messages. We call these networks isotropic channels, broadcast channels in which receivers cannot reliably determine whether a given message originated from any particular sender and senders cannot prevent a message from reaching any particular receiver. As long as eavesdroppers cannot reliably (i.e., with probabilistic certainty) identify the sender of a message, honest parties can efficiently exchange messages with confidentiality that asymptotically approaches and in some cases reaches perfect secrecy. Even under incorrect assumptions regarding the degree of isotropism offered by a particular channel, a high measure of confidentiality can be efficiently achieved. This position paper additionally makes the case that isotropic channels already exist, and are, in fact, often used in practice. By leveraging isotropic techniques, measurable information theoretic security can be practically achieved.