Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
Web MIXes: a system for anonymous and unobservable Internet access
International workshop on Designing privacy enhancing technologies: design issues in anonymity and unobservability
ISDN-MIXes: Untraceable Communication with Small Bandwidth Overhead
Kommunikation in Verteilten Systemen, Grundlagen, Anwendungen, Betrieb, GI/ITG-Fachtagung
Mixminion: Design of a Type III Anonymous Remailer Protocol
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Tracking anonymous peer-to-peer VoIP calls on the internet
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Finding "Who Is Talking to Whom" in VoIP Networks via Progressive Stream Clustering
ICDM '06 Proceedings of the Sixth International Conference on Data Mining
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
Language identification of encrypted VoIP traffic: Alejandra y Roberto or Alice and Bob?
SS'07 Proceedings of 16th USENIX Security Symposium on USENIX Security Symposium
Spot Me if You Can: Uncovering Spoken Phrases in Encrypted VoIP Conversations
SP '08 Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Online pairing of VoIP conversations
The VLDB Journal — The International Journal on Very Large Data Bases
A framework for identity privacy in SIP
Journal of Network and Computer Applications
Peer-to-Peer VoIP communications using anonymisation overlay networks
CMS'10 Proceedings of the 11th IFIP TC 6/TC 11 international conference on Communications and Multimedia Security
Speaker recognition from encrypted VoIP communications
Digital Investigation: The International Journal of Digital Forensics & Incident Response
On the anonymity and traceability of peer-to-peer VoIP calls
IEEE Network: The Magazine of Global Internetworking
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While confidentiality of telephone conversation contents has recently received considerable attention in Internet telephony (VoIP), the protection of the caller--callee relation is largely unexplored. From the privacy research community we learn that this relation can be protected by Chaum's mixes. In early proposals of mix networks, however, it was reasonable to assume that high latency is acceptable. While the general idea has been deployed for low latency networks as well, important security measures had to be dropped for achieving performance. The result is protection against a considerably weaker adversary model in exchange for usability. In this paper, we show that it is unjustified to conclude that low latency network applications imply weak protection. On the contrary, we argue that current Internet telephony protocols provide a range of promising preconditions for adopting anonymity services with security properties similar to those of high latency anonymity networks. We expect that implementing anonymity services becomes a major challenge as customer privacy becomes one of the most important secondary goals in any (commercial) Internet application.