CCS '93 Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Fairness in electronic commerce
Fairness in electronic commerce
Secret Handshakes from Pairing-Based Key Agreements
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
k-anonymous secret handshakes with reusable credentials
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Unlinkable Secret Handshakes and Key-Private Group Key Management Schemes
ACNS '07 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security
Authenticated key exchange secure against dictionary attacks
EUROCRYPT'00 Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Provably secure password-authenticated key exchange using Diffie-Hellman
EUROCRYPT'00 Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Beyond secret handshakes: affiliation-hiding authenticated key exchange
CT-RSA'08 Proceedings of the 2008 The Cryptopgraphers' Track at the RSA conference on Topics in cryptology
Secret handshakes with revocation support
ICISC'09 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Information security and cryptology
WCC'05 Proceedings of the 2005 international conference on Coding and Cryptography
Efficient identity-based encryption without random oracles
EUROCRYPT'05 Proceedings of the 24th annual international conference on Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
Authentication for paranoids: multi-party secret handshakes
ACNS'06 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security
Secret handshakes from ID-based message recovery signatures: A new generic approach
Computers and Electrical Engineering
Private mutual authentications with fuzzy matching
International Journal of High Performance Systems Architecture
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Secret Handshakes are well-established cryptographic primitives that help two mistrusting users to establish initial trust by proving and verifying possession of given properties, such as group membership. All the Secret Handshake schemes to date assume the existence of a single, centralized Certification Authority (CA). We challenge this assumption and create the first Secret Handshake scheme that can be managed by a federation of separate and mistrusting CAs, that collaborate in the setup of the scheme yet retaining strict control over subsets of the property in the system. The security of the scheme is proved without random oracles.