STOC '98 Proceedings of the thirtieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Secret Handshakes from Pairing-Based Key Agreements
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Oblivious signature-based envelope
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual symposium on Principles of distributed computing
k-anonymous secret handshakes with reusable credentials
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
Authenticated key exchange secure against dictionary attacks
EUROCRYPT'00 Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
WCC'05 Proceedings of the 2005 international conference on Coding and Cryptography
A flexible framework for secret handshakes
PET'06 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Group secret handshakes or affiliation-hiding authenticated group key agreement
CT-RSA'07 Proceedings of the 7th Cryptographers' track at the RSA conference on Topics in Cryptology
ICALP '08 Proceedings of the 35th international colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming, Part II
A novel and efficient unlinkable secret handshakes scheme
IEEE Communications Letters
On the security of a novel and efficient unlinkable secret handshakes scheme
IEEE Communications Letters
Security analysis of an unlinkable secret handshakes scheme
IEEE Communications Letters
Taming big brother ambitions: more privacy for secret handshakes
PETS'10 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Credential authenticated identification and key exchange
CRYPTO'10 Proceedings of the 30th annual conference on Advances in cryptology
Secret handshakes with revocation support
ICISC'09 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Information security and cryptology
Okamoto-Tanaka revisited: fully authenticated diffie-hellman with minimal overhead
ACNS'10 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Applied cryptography and network security
Affiliation-hiding key exchange with untrusted group authorities
ACNS'10 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Applied cryptography and network security
Privacy-preserving group discovery with linear complexity
ACNS'10 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Applied cryptography and network security
Federated secret handshakes with support for revocation
ICICS'10 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Information and communications security
Practical affiliation-hiding authentication from improved polynomial interpolation
Proceedings of the 6th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security
Affiliation-hiding authentication with minimal bandwidth consumption
WISTP'11 Proceedings of the 5th IFIP WG 11.2 international conference on Information security theory and practice: security and privacy of mobile devices in wireless communication
Private discovery of common social contacts
ACNS'11 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Applied cryptography and network security
Secret handshakes from ID-based message recovery signatures: A new generic approach
Computers and Electrical Engineering
Privacy of Community Pseudonyms in Wireless Peer-to-Peer Networks
Mobile Networks and Applications
Private mutual authentications with fuzzy matching
International Journal of High Performance Systems Architecture
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Public key based authentication and key exchange protocols are not usually designed with privacy in mind and thus involve cleartext exchanges of identities and certificates before actual authentication. In contrast, an Affiliation-Hiding Authentication Protocol, also called a Secret Handshake, allows two parties with certificates issued by the same organization to authenticate each other in a private way. Namely, one party can prove to the other that it has a valid organizational certificate, yet this proof hides the identity of the issuing organization unless the other party also has a valid certificate from the same organization. We consider a very strong notion of Secret Handshakes, namely Affiliation-Hiding Authenticated Key Exchange protocols (AH-AKE), which guarantee security under arbitrary composition of protocol sessions, including man-in-the-middle attacks. The contribution of our paper is three-fold: First, we extend existing notions of AH-AKE security to Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS), which guarantees session security even if its participants are later corrupted or any other sessions are compromised. Second, in parallel to PFS security, we specify the exact level of privacy protection, which we call Linkable Affiliation-Hiding (LAH), that an AH-AKE protocol can provide in the face of player corruptions and session compromises. Third, we show an AH-AKE protocol that achieves both PFS and LAH properties, under the RSA assumption in ROM, at minimal costs of 3 communication rounds and two (multi)exponentiations per player.