The design of the UNIX operating system
The design of the UNIX operating system
Design and Implementation of Secure Xenix
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering - Special issue on computer security and privacy
Covert-channel analysis in secure computer systems
Covert-channel analysis in secure computer systems
An experimental time-sharing system
AIEE-IRE '62 (Spring) Proceedings of the May 1-3, 1962, spring joint computer conference
Evaluating the transmission rate of covert timing channels in a network
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
Turtles all the way down: a clean-slate, ground-up, first-principles approach to secure systems
Proceedings of the 2012 workshop on New security paradigms
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Most practical policies for handling covert storage channels are based on bandwidth-limitation techniques. In this paper we present a Markov model for bandwidth computation and its application to Secure Xenix. The model can be used for computing the bandwidth of both individual channels and aggregated channels (i.e., serial and parallel aggregation). Based on this model, a tool has been built and experiments conducted to determine the factors that affect the bandwidth of covert storage channels (i.e., noise, scheduling delays, load, "think times"). The tool can be used to compute the minimum delays for each channel under various loads and program behavior. Thus, it enables the placement dynamically-adjustable delays in multiprogrammed systems, which guarantees minimum performance impact.