Design and Implementation of Secure Xenix

Authors:
Virgil D. Gligor;C. S. Chandersekaran;Robert S. Chapman;Leslie J. Dotterer;Matthew S. Hecht;Wen-Der Jiang;Abhai Johri;Gary L. Luckenbaugh;N. Vasudevan
Affiliations:
Univ. of Maryland, College Park;IBM Corporation, Gaithersburg, MD;IBM Corporation, Gaithersburg, MD;IBM Corporation, Gaithersburg, MD;IBM Corporation, Gaithersburg, MD;IBM Corporation, Gaithersburg, MD;IBM Corporation, Gaithersburg, MD;IBM Corporation, Gaithersburg, MD;IBM Corporation, Gaithersburg, MD
Venue:
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering - Special issue on computer security and privacy
Year:
1987

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Abstract

Secure Xenix is an experimental system designed to run on IBM PC/AT workstations. Like Xenix, it is a Unix System V implementation on the PC/AT workstation; unlike Xenix, it eliminates the Unix security deficiencies and it enhances security policies. In this paper, we present the design features of Secure Xenix, their integration within Xenix, and some of the lessons learned from this experiment to date.