Design and Implementation of Secure Xenix
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering - Special issue on computer security and privacy
An Experience Using Two Covert Channel Analysis Techniques on a Real System Design
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering - Special issue on computer security and privacy
An Axiomatic Approach to Information Flow in Programs
ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems (TOPLAS)
Shared resource matrix methodology: an approach to identifying storage and timing channels
ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
Certification of programs for secure information flow
Communications of the ACM
A lattice model of secure information flow
Communications of the ACM
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Communications of the ACM
A note on the confinement problem
Communications of the ACM
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SOSP '75 Proceedings of the fifth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles
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SOSP '75 Proceedings of the fifth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles
Information transmission in computational systems
SOSP '77 Proceedings of the sixth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles
Resolving covert channels within a B2 class secure system
ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review
Covert-channel analysis in secure computer systems
Covert-channel analysis in secure computer systems
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ACM '77 Proceedings of the 1977 annual conference
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ACM SIGICE Bulletin
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
Classification of Security Properties (Part I: Information Flow)
FOSAD '00 Revised versions of lectures given during the IFIP WG 1.7 International School on Foundations of Security Analysis and Design on Foundations of Security Analysis and Design: Tutorial Lectures
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Journal of Computer Security
A security domain model to assess software for exploitable covert channels
Proceedings of the third ACM SIGPLAN workshop on Programming languages and analysis for security
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Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Interaction Sciences: Information Technology, Culture and Human
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Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
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ACSAC'05 Proceedings of the 10th Asia-Pacific conference on Advances in Computer Systems Architecture
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ICISC'05 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Information Security and Cryptology
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Computer Languages, Systems and Structures
Analysis of the communication between colluding applications on modern smartphones
Proceedings of the 28th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
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A practical method for the identification of covert storage channels is presented and its application to the source code of the Secure Xenix kernel is illustrated. The method is based on the identification of all visible/alterable kernel variables by using information-flow analysis of language code. The method also requires that, after the sharing relationships among the kernel primitives and the visible/alterable variables are determined, the nondiscretionary access rules implemented by each primitive be applied to identify the potential storage channels. The method can be generalized to other implementation languages, and has the following advantages: it helps discover all potential storage channels is kernel code, thereby helping determine whether the nondiscretionary access rules are implemented correctly; it helps avoid discovery of false flow violations and their unnecessary analysis; and it helps identify the kernel locations where audit code and time-delay variables need to be placed for covert-channel handling.