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| Hi-index | 48.25 |
A security kernel is a software and hardware mechanism that enforces access controls within a computer system. The correctness of a security kernel on a PDP-11/45 is being proved. This paper describes the technique used to carry out the first step of the proof: validating a formal specification of the program with respect to axioms for a secure system.