Secure databases: protection against user influence
ACM Transactions on Database Systems (TODS)
The tracker: a threat to statistical database security
ACM Transactions on Database Systems (TODS)
A Linear Time Algorithm for Deciding Subject Security
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Operating System Structures to Support Security and Reliable Software
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)
Specification and verification of the UCLA Unix security kernel
Communications of the ACM
Social processes and proofs of theorems and programs
Communications of the ACM
Password security: a case history
Communications of the ACM
Communications of the ACM
Proof techniques for hierarchically structured programs
Communications of the ACM
A model for verification of data security in operating systems
Communications of the ACM
Certification of programs for secure information flow
Communications of the ACM
Intentional resolution of privacy protection in database systems
Communications of the ACM
A lattice model of secure information flow
Communications of the ACM
Security Kernel validation in practice
Communications of the ACM
Protection in operating systems
Communications of the ACM
A user authentication scheme not requiring secrecy in the computer
Communications of the ACM
A high security log-in procedure
Communications of the ACM
Monitors: an operating system structuring concept
Communications of the ACM
On the criteria to be used in decomposing systems into modules
Communications of the ACM
Computer Security
Computer Security
Security and protection of data in the IBM System/38
ISCA '80 Proceedings of the 7th annual symposium on Computer Architecture
A hardware architecture for controlling information flow
ISCA '78 Proceedings of the 5th annual symposium on Computer architecture
Engineering a security kernel for Multics
SOSP '75 Proceedings of the fifth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles
The Multics kernel design project
SOSP '77 Proceedings of the sixth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles
Proving multilevel security of a system design
SOSP '77 Proceedings of the sixth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles
Structured specification of a Security Kernel
Proceedings of the international conference on Reliable software
A verifiable protection system
Proceedings of the international conference on Reliable software
A verified program-verifier.
Program confinement in KVM/370
ACM '77 Proceedings of the 1977 annual conference
VM/370 security retrofit program
ACM '77 Proceedings of the 1977 annual conference
Privacy and security of data communications and data bases
VLDB '78 Proceedings of the fourth international conference on Very Large Data Bases - Volume 4
Review and Revocation of Access Privileges Distributed Through Capabilities
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
Security considerations in a multi-programmed computer system
AFIPS '67 (Spring) Proceedings of the April 18-20, 1967, spring joint computer conference
Security controls in the ADEPT-50 time-sharing system
AFIPS '69 (Fall) Proceedings of the November 18-20, 1969, fall joint computer conference
AFIPS '75 Proceedings of the May 19-22, 1975, national computer conference and exposition
Verifiable secure operating system software
AFIPS '74 Proceedings of the May 6-10, 1974, national computer conference and exposition
AFIPS '74 Proceedings of the May 6-10, 1974, national computer conference and exposition
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A security policy for a profile-oriented operating system is described that is adopted from state-of-the-art security properties designed to meet even the strict security requirements of the Department of Defense. The policy is built around user, execution, and program profiles that serve as repositories for security related information. The security terms access category, access list, security level, clearance level, subject, object, discretionary and nondiscretionary security, and profile are defined. The six security rules that form the foundation of system security are described. Their interactions are detailed and examples are given. The six rules are: discretionary security condition, simple security condition, *-property (star property), tranquility principle, nonaccessibility of deleted objects, and rewriting of newly created objects.