Security Kernel validation in practice
Communications of the ACM
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Communications of the ACM
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GI - 4. Jahrestagung
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SOSP '75 Proceedings of the fifth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles
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ICSE '76 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Software engineering
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SOSP '81 Proceedings of the eighth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles
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Proceedings of the 2006 workshop on Programming languages and analysis for security
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Proceedings of the conference on Design, automation and test in Europe
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CASSIS'05 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Construction and Analysis of Safe, Secure, and Interoperable Smart Devices
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ICTCS'05 Proceedings of the 9th Italian conference on Theoretical Computer Science
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This paper summarizes current research at RI aimed at developing secure operating systems and verifying certain critical properties of these systems. It is seen that proofs of design properties can be relatively straightforward when the design is specified in suitable formal specification language. These proofs demonstrate the correspondence between the desired properties and a specification of the system design. Various on-line tools aid considerably in this process. In addition, correctness proofs for implementations of such systems are now feasible, because of both various theoretical advances and the use of supporting tools.