Formal languages
On the Identification of Covert Storage Channels in Secure Systems
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
Covert Flow Trees: A Visual Approach to Analyzing Covert Storage Channels
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
Shared resource matrix methodology: an approach to identifying storage and timing channels
ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
Ether: malware analysis via hardware virtualization extensions
Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
VEE '12 Proceedings of the 8th ACM SIGPLAN/SIGOPS conference on Virtual Execution Environments
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Covert channel is a famous drawback exists in most of multilevel security systems. Both TESEC and CC standards need covert channel analysis when secure software tries to get the certification of some security levels, i.e. B2 and EAL5 or above in TCSEC and CC, respectively. Search method is one of the most important works with ad hoc characters in covert channels analysis. Though some semi auto tools have been built, peoples who work in this area are eager to develop an auto search tool to find all of covert channels since it was first known in 1973. This paper proves that willingness is a kind of undecidable problems, by which illustrates it's impossible to build a program which can identify all of covert channels in a security computer system automatically.