An Experience Using Two Covert Channel Analysis Techniques on a Real System Design

Authors:
J. Thomas Haigh;Richard A. Kemmerer;John McHugh;William D. Young
Affiliations:
Honeywell Secure Computing Technology Center, St. Anthony, MN;Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge;Research Triangle Institute, Research Triangle Park, NC;Honeywell Secure Computing Technology Center, St. Anthony, MN and Univ. of Texas at Austin, Austin
Venue:
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering - Special issue on computer security and privacy
Year:
1987

Citing 0
Cited 6

On the Identification of Covert Storage Channels in Secure Systems

IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
Covert Flow Trees: A Visual Approach to Analyzing Covert Storage Channels

IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
Mathematics, Technology, and Trust: Formal Verification, Computer Security, and the U.S. Military

IEEE Annals of the History of Computing
Database Concurrency Control in Multilevel Secure Database Management Systems

IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering
New constructive approach to covert channel modeling and channel capacity estimation

ISC'05 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Information Security
An iterative approach for the satisfaction of security using the intransitive non-interference property

VECoS'11 Proceedings of the Fifth international conference on Verification and Evaluation of Computer and Communication Systems

Quantified Score

Hi-index	0.00

Visualization

Abstract

This paper examines the application of two covert channel analysis techniques to a high level design for a real system, the Honeywell Secure Ada® Target (SAT). The techniques used were a version of the noninterference model of multilevel security due to Goguen and Meseguer and the shared resource matrix method of Kemmerer. Both techniques were applied to the Gypsy Abstract Model of the SAT. The paper discusses the application of the techniques and the nature of the covert channels discovered. The relative strengths and weaknesses of the two methods are discussed and criteria for an ideal covert channel tool are developed.