The Design of Rijndael
Secret Error-Correcting Codes (SECC)
CRYPTO '88 Proceedings of the 8th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
The Rao-Nam Scheme is Insecure Against a Chosen-Plaintext Attack
CRYPTO '87 A Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques on Advances in Cryptology
Joint encryption and error correction schemes
ISCA '84 Proceedings of the 11th annual international symposium on Computer architecture
TestU01: A C library for empirical testing of random number generators
ACM Transactions on Mathematical Software (TOMS)
On the design of error-correcting ciphers
EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking
On the (in)security of two Joint Encryption and Error Correction schemes
International Journal of Security and Networks
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We present a joint scheme that combines both error correction and security at the physical layer. In conventional communication systems, error correction is carried out at the physical layer while data security is performed at an upper layer. As a result, these steps are done as separate steps. However there has been a lot of interest in providing security at the physical layer. As a result, as opposed to the conventional system, we present a scheme that combines error correction and data security as one unit so that both encryption and encoding could be carried out at the physical layer. Hence, in this paper, we present an Error Correction-Based Cipher (ECBC) that combines error correction and encryption/decryption in a single step. Encrypting and encoding or decoding and decrypting in a single step will lead to a faster and more efficient implementation. One of the challenges of using previous joint schemes in a communications channel is that there is a tradeoff between data reliability and security. However, in ECBC, there is no tradeoff between reliability and security. Errors introduced at the transmitter for randomization are removed at the receiver. Hence ECBC can utilize its full capacity to correct channel errors.We show the result of randomization test on ECBC and its security against conventional attacks. We also present the nonpipelined and pipelined hardware architecture of ECBC, and the result of the FPGA implementation of the ECBC encryption.We also compare these results with non-ECBC schemes.