Encryption and Error-Correction Coding Using D Sequences
IEEE Transactions on Computers
Secret Error-Correcting Codes (SECC)
CRYPTO '88 Proceedings of the 8th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Cryptanalysis of the Hwang-Rao Secret Error-Correcting Code Schemes
ICICS '01 Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Information and Communications Security
The Rao-Nam Scheme is Insecure Against a Chosen-Plaintext Attack
CRYPTO '87 A Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques on Advances in Cryptology
KATAN and KTANTAN -- A Family of Small and Efficient Hardware-Oriented Block Ciphers
CHES '09 Proceedings of the 11th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Joint scheme for physical layer error correction and security
ISRN Communications and Networking
Secret keys from channel noise
EUROCRYPT'11 Proceedings of the 30th Annual international conference on Theory and applications of cryptographic techniques: advances in cryptology
Applications of LDPC Codes to the Wiretap Channel
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
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Joint Encryption and Error Correction (JEEC) is proposed to combine encoding/encryption as one process to boost more compact implementations. In this paper, we provide rigorous investigation on the security of two JECC schemes, namely ECBC and SECC. For ECBC, we found a 3-stage differential-like attack, which breaks it with O(k × 2deg(f) + 2k) effort, where deg(f) is the degree of the core cryptographic function f and k is the block length. For SECC, we found a similar attack of complexity O(k × 2k+1). Additionally, we exhibit that f used in ECBC is particularly vulnerable, which allows the secret matrix to be recovered in O(1). To mitigate this vulnerability, we propose a secure-yet-lightweight construction of f. Finally, the core part of our attack has been implemented. Experimental results confirm that the original implementation of ECBC can be broken in constant time (<0.4 s) regardless of k, whereas the ECBC enhanced by our proposed f can withstand this attack to the maximum extent.