Completeness theorems for non-cryptographic fault-tolerant distributed computation
STOC '88 Proceedings of the twentieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Multiparty unconditionally secure protocols
STOC '88 Proceedings of the twentieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Verifiable secret sharing and multiparty protocols with honest majority
STOC '89 Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Multiparty protocols tolerating half faulty processors
CRYPTO '89 Proceedings on Advances in cryptology
Asynchronous secure computation
STOC '93 Proceedings of the twenty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Composition and integrity preservation of secure reactive systems
Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Foundations of Cryptography: Basic Tools
Foundations of Cryptography: Basic Tools
SIAM Journal on Computing
Parallel Reducibility for Information-Theoretically Secure Computation
CRYPTO '00 Proceedings of the 20th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Fair Computation of General Functions in Presence of Immoral Majority
CRYPTO '90 Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
CRYPTO '91 Proceedings of the 11th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Foundations of Secure Interactive Computing
CRYPTO '91 Proceedings of the 11th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Universally Composable Notions of Key Exchange and Secure Channels
EUROCRYPT '02 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques: Advances in Cryptology
Bounded-concurrent secure two-party computation without setup assumptions
Proceedings of the thirty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
An asynchronous [(n - 1)/3]-resilient consensus protocol
PODC '84 Proceedings of the third annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Universally Composable Security: A New Paradigm for Cryptographic Protocols
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Foundations of Cryptography: Volume 2, Basic Applications
Foundations of Cryptography: Volume 2, Basic Applications
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Simulatable Security and Polynomially Bounded Concurrent Composability
SP '06 Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Information-theoretically secure protocols and security under composition
Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Lower Bounds and Impossibility Results for Concurrent Self Composition
Journal of Cryptology
How to generate and exchange secrets
SFCS '86 Proceedings of the 27th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
General Composition and Universal Composability in Secure Multiparty Computation
Journal of Cryptology
Efficient multiparty computations secure against an adaptive adversary
EUROCRYPT'99 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
On the necessity of rewinding in secure multiparty computation
TCC'07 Proceedings of the 4th conference on Theory of cryptography
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We investigate the question of whether the security of protocols in the information-theoretic setting (where the adversary is computationally unbounded) implies the security of these protocols under concurrent composition. This question is motivated by the folklore that all known protocols that are secure in the information-theoretic setting are indeed secure under concurrent composition. We provide answers to this question for a number of different settings (i.e., considering perfect versus statistical security, and concurrent composition with adaptive versus fixed inputs). Our results enhance the understanding of what is necessary for obtaining security under composition, as well as providing tools (i.e., composition theorems) that can be used for proving the security of protocols under composition while considering only the standard stand-alone definitions of security.