The cathedral and the bazaar: musings on Linux and open source by an accidental revolutionary
The cathedral and the bazaar: musings on Linux and open source by an accidental revolutionary
Rebel Code: Linux and the Open Source Revolution
Rebel Code: Linux and the Open Source Revolution
Free for All: How Linux and the Free Software Movement Undercut the High-Tech Titans
Free for All: How Linux and the Free Software Movement Undercut the High-Tech Titans
Business and Economics of Linux and Open Source
Business and Economics of Linux and Open Source
Perspectives on Free and Open Source Software
Perspectives on Free and Open Source Software
Working for Free? Motivations for Participating in Open-Source Projects
International Journal of Electronic Commerce
Learning from Experience in Software Development: A Multilevel Analysis
Management Science
Developer Heterogeneity and Formation of Communication Networks in Open Source Software Projects
Journal of Management Information Systems
A Hidden Markov Model of Developer Learning Dynamics in Open Source Software Projects
Information Systems Research
Developer Heterogeneity and Formation of Communication Networks in Open Source Software Projects
Journal of Management Information Systems
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Many successful open-source projects have been developed by programmers who were employed by firms but worked on open-source projects on the side because of economic incentives like career improvement benefits. Such side work may be a good thing for the employing firms, too, if they get some strategic value from the open-source software and if the productivity of the programmers on these projects improves through learning-by-doing effects. However, the programmers may work more or less on these projects than what is best for the firms. To manage the programmers' efforts, the firms set appropriate employment policies and incentives. These policies and career concerns then together govern the programmers' effort allocation between the open-source and proprietary projects. We examine this relationship using a variant of the principal/agent model. We derive and characterize optimal employment contracts and show that firms either offer a bonus for only one of the two projects or do not offer any bonuses. However, if attractive alternate employment opportunities are available, they change their strategy and may offer bonuses for both projects simultaneously.