Differential Collisions in SHA-0
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ACISP '09 Proceedings of the 14th Australasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy
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Finding collisions in the full SHA-1
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Inscrypt'11 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Information Security and Cryptology
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This paper provides three important contributions to the security analysis of SIMD. First, we show a new free-start distinguisher based on symmetry relations. It allows to distinguish the compression function of SIMD from a random function with a single evaluation. Then, we show that a class of free-start distinguishers is not a threat to wide-pipe hash functions. In particular, this means that our distinguisher has a minimal impact on the security of the SIMD hash function. Intuitively, the reason why this distinguisher does not weaken the function is that getting into a symmetric state is about as hard as finding a preimage. Finally, we study differential path in SIMD, and give an upper bound on the probability of related key differential paths. Our bound is in the order of 2-n/2 using very weak assumptions.