Precomputing Oblivious Transfer
CRYPTO '95 Proceedings of the 15th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Oblivious Transfer with a Memory-Bounded Receiver
FOCS '98 Proceedings of the 39th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Foundations of Cryptography: Volume 2, Basic Applications
Foundations of Cryptography: Volume 2, Basic Applications
Constant-Round Oblivious Transfer in the Bounded Storage Model
Journal of Cryptology
A New Interactive Hashing Theorem
CCC '07 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second Annual IEEE Conference on Computational Complexity
FOCS '07 Proceedings of the 48th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Interactive hashing and reductions between oblivious transfer variants
Interactive hashing and reductions between oblivious transfer variants
Oblivious Transfer Based on the McEliece Assumptions
ICITS '08 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Information Theoretic Security
Coding-Based Oblivious Transfer
Mathematical Methods in Computer Science
Proceedings of the 5th conference on Theory of cryptography
TCC'08 Proceedings of the 5th conference on Theory of cryptography
Semi-honest to malicious oblivious transfer: the black-box way
TCC'08 Proceedings of the 5th conference on Theory of cryptography
A code-based 1-out-of-n oblivious transfer based on mceliece assumptions
ISPEC'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Information Security Practice and Experience
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We present two protocols for reducing oblivious transfer (OT) to the security of trapdoor permutations and to the hardness of some coding problems, respectively. The first protocol is the most efficient known to date, while the second one is a theoretical proof-of-concept. Our constructions leverage the power of Interactive Hashing (IH). The first protocol can be viewed as a simple modification of the well-known OT construction by Even, Goldreich and Lem-pel (1985), in which a receiver must send a random domain element to a sender through IH. Alternatively, our protocol can be viewed as a simple modification of the construction by Ostrovsky, Venkatesan and Yung (1993), in which the players substitute the one-way permutation with a trapdoor permutation. We use a similar approach to derive a second OT protocol based on coding assumptions related to security of the McEliece cryptosystem. In our second construction, the receiver inputs a public key into IH while privately keeping the corresponding secret key. Two different versions of IH are used: the computationally secure one in the first protocol, and the information-theoretically secure one in the second.