Coding-Based Oblivious Transfer

  • Authors:
  • Kazukuni Kobara;Kirill Morozov;Raphael Overbeck

  • Affiliations:
  • RCIS, AIST, Tokyo, Japan 101-0021;RCIS, AIST, Tokyo, Japan 101-0021;EPFL - I&C - ISC - LASEC, Lausanne, Switzerland CH-1015

  • Venue:
  • Mathematical Methods in Computer Science
  • Year:
  • 2008

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Abstract

We present protocols for two flavors of oblivious transfer (OT): the Rabin and 1-out-of-2 OT based on the assumptions related to security of the McEliece cryptosystem and two zero-knowledge identification (ZKID) schemes, Stern's from Crypto '93 and Shamir's from Crypto '89, which are based on syndrome decoding and permuted kernels, respectively. This is a step towards diversifying computational assumptions on which OT --- cryptographic primitive of central importance --- can be based. As a by-product, we expose new interesting applications for both ZKID schemes: Stern's can be used for proving correctness of McEliece encryption, while Shamir's --- for proving that some matrix represents a permuted subcode of a given code. Unfortunately, it turned out to be difficult to reduce the sender's security of both schemes to a hard problem, although the intuition suggests a successful attack may allow to solve some long-standing problems in coding theory.