An efficient reverse auction mechanism for limited supplier base

Authors:
Arun K. Ray;Mamata Jenamani;Pratap K. J. Mohapatra
Affiliations:
Department of Industrial Engineering and Management, Indian Institute of Technology, Kharagpur, India;Department of Industrial Engineering and Management, Indian Institute of Technology, Kharagpur, India;Department of Industrial Engineering and Management, Indian Institute of Technology, Kharagpur, India
Venue:
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
Year:
2011

Citing 11
Cited 4

An experimental analysis of multi-attribute auctions

Decision Support Systems
Winner determination in combinatorial auction generalizations

Proceedings of the first international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems: part 1
An Elementary Introduction to Auctions

Interfaces
Supply Contract Competition and Sourcing Policies

Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
BOB: improved winner determination in combinatorial auctions and generalizations

Artificial Intelligence
Combinatorial Auctions: A Survey

INFORMS Journal on Computing
An Inverse-Optimization-Based Auction Mechanism to Support a Multiattribute RFQ Process

Management Science
Bidding in sealed-bid and English multi-attribute auctions

Decision Support Systems
Better, Faster, Cheaper: An Experimental Analysis of a Multiattribute Reverse Auction Mechanism with Restricted Information Feedback

Management Science
Efficient Auction Mechanisms for Supply Chain Procurement

Management Science
Market-Based Task Allocation Mechanisms for Limited-Capacity Suppliers

IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part A: Systems and Humans

Procurement decision making mechanism of divisible goods based on multi-attribute auction

Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
Relationship preserving multi-attribute reverse auction: A web-based experimental analysis

Computers and Industrial Engineering
Bid evaluation behavior in online procurement auctions involving technical and business experts

Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
Decision support for preference elicitation in multi-attribute electronic procurement auctions through an agent-based intermediary

Decision Support Systems

Quantified Score

Hi-index	0.01

Visualization

Abstract

Reverse auction degrades the buyer-supplier relationship and decreases the suppliers' interest to participate in subsequent auctions. The effect is particularly severe in a limited supplier base. We propose a novel multi-attribute relationship-preserving reverse auction mechanism for a limited supplier base. The mechanism consists of two parts: first, evaluation of suppliers' utility with an idea of intermittently awarding some business to each one of them as incentive and second, a penalty scheme integrated with winner determination model to deal with the untruthful behavior of the buyer and the suppliers. The mechanism enables healthy competition among the suppliers by retaining them in the supplier base. The simulation study interestingly shows that a buyer derives higher utility by using the proposed mechanism as compared to the existing mechanism where no incentive is provided to the suppliers.