An experimental analysis of multi-attribute auctions
Decision Support Systems
Is Subsidizing Inefficient Bidders Actually Costly?
Management Science
Bidding in sealed-bid and English multi-attribute auctions
Decision Support Systems
Relationship preserving auction for repeated e-procurement
Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Electronic commerce
An efficient reverse auction mechanism for limited supplier base
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
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Repeated use of reverse auction often degrades the buyer-supplier relationship. Theoretical studies show that providing incentive to the losing but competing suppliers can keep them interested to participate in future auctions thereby maintaining a healthy level of competition. We conduct web-based experiments to validate this theoretical observation in multi-attribute reverse auctions. We compare incentive-oriented and standard multi-attribute reverse auctions and demonstrate that the results in the laboratory setting corroborate the theoretical findings. Adopting incentive-oriented mechanism, the buyer is able to provide better utility to suppliers while protecting her own. We conclude that such a mechanism can reduce the negative perception of the suppliers and help build better buyer-supplier relationship in the long run.