Data networks
Slotted Aloha as a game with partial information
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
A jamming-resistant MAC protocol for single-hop wireless networks
Proceedings of the twenty-seventh ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Impact of denial of service attacks on ad hoc networks
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Jamming Mitigation in Multi-Radio Wireless Networks: Reactive or Proactive?
Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Security and privacy in communication netowrks
Monitoring the application-layer DDoS attacks for popular websites
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Utility-optimal random access without message passing
IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications
A jamming game in wireless networks with transmission cost
NET-COOP'07 Proceedings of the 1st EuroFGI international conference on Network control and optimization
Stackelberg contention games in multiuser networks
EURASIP Journal on Advances in Signal Processing - Special issue on game theory in signal processing and communications
Fundamental design issues for the future Internet
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
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MAC layer jamming is a common attack on wireless networks, which is easy to launch by the attacker and which is very effective in disrupting the service provided by the network. Most of the current MAC protocols for wireless networks, for example, IEEE 802.11, do not provide sufficient protection against MAC layer jamming attacks. In this paper, we first use a non-cooperative game model to characterize the interactions among a group of self-interested regular users and a malicious user. It can be shown that the Nash equilibrium of this game is either inefficient or unfair for the regular users. We introduce a policer (an intervention user) who uses an intervention function to transform the original non-cooperative game into a new non-cooperative game augmented by the intervention function, in which the users will adjust to play a Nash equilibrium of the augmented game. By properly designing the intervention function, we show that the intervention user can effectively mitigate the jamming attacks from the malicious user, and at the same time let the regular users choose more efficient transmission strategies. It is proved that any feasible point in the rate region can be achieved as a Nash equilibrium of the augmented game by appropriately designing the intervention.