Computing correlated equilibria in multi-player games
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Computing correlated equilibria in multi-player games
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
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In a landmark paper, Papadimitriou and Roughgarden described a polynomial-time algorithm ("Ellipsoid Against Hope") for computing sample correlated equilibria of concisely-represented games. Recently, Stein, Parrilo and Ozdaglar showed that this algorithm can fail to find an exact correlated equilibrium, but can be easily modified to efficiently compute approximate correlated equilibria. It remained an open problem to determine whether the algorithm can be modified to compute an exact correlated equilibrium. In a new paper, we showed that it can, presenting a variant of the Ellipsoid Against Hope algorithm that guarantees the polynomial-time identification of exact correlated equilibrium. Our new algorithm differs from the original primarily in its use of a separation oracle that produces cuts corresponding to pure-strategy profiles. As a result, we no longer face the numerical precision issues encountered by the original approach, and both the resulting algorithm and its analysis are considerably simplified. Our new separation oracle can be understood as a derandomization of Papadimitriou and Roughgarden's original separation oracle via the method of conditional expectations.