On complexity as bounded rationality (extended abstract)
STOC '94 Proceedings of the twenty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Extensive games with possibly unaware players
AAMAS '06 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Unawareness, beliefs and games
TARK '07 Proceedings of the 11th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
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We summarize our work on a general game-theoretic framework for reasoning about strategic agents performing possibly costly computation. In this framework, many traditional game-theoretic results (such as the existence of a Nash equilibrium) no longer hold. Nevertheless, we can use the framework to provide psychologically appealing explanations to observed behavior in well-studied games (such as finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma and rock-paper-scissors).