Belief, awareness, and limited reasoning
Artificial Intelligence
Interactive unawareness revisited
TARK '05 Proceedings of the 10th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Extensive games with possibly unaware players
AAMAS '06 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players, I-III
Management Science
Beyond nash equilibrium: solution concepts for the 21st century
Proceedings of the twenty-seventh ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Algorithmic rationality: adding cost of computation to game theory
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
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We define a generalized state-space model with interactive unawareness and probabilistic beliefs. Such models are desirable for many potential applications of asymmetric unawareness. We develop Bayesian games with unawareness, define equilibrium, and prove existence. We show how equilibria are extended naturally from lower to higher awareness levels and restricted from higher to lower awareness levels. We use our unawareness belief structure to show that the common prior assumption is too weak to rule out speculative trade in all states. Yet, we prove a generalized "No-trade" theorem according to which there can not be common certainty of strict preference to trade. Moreover, we show a generalization of the "No-agreeing-to-disagree" theorem.