Belief, awareness, and limited reasoning
Artificial Intelligence
A nonstandard approach to the logical omniscience problem
Artificial Intelligence
Proceedings of the 9th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Reasoning About Knowledge
TARK '07 Proceedings of the 11th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
A canonical model for interactive unawareness
TARK '07 Proceedings of the 11th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Unawareness, beliefs and games
TARK '07 Proceedings of the 11th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
An extended interpreted system model for epistemic logics
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Dealing with logical omniscience: Expressiveness and pragmatics
Artificial Intelligence
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We analyze a model of interactive unawareness introduced by Heifetz, Meier and Schipper (HMS). We consider two axiomatizations for their model, which capture different notions of validity. These axiomatizations allow us to compare the HMS approach to both the standard (S5) epistemic logic and two other approaches to unawareness: that of Fagin and Halpern and that of Modica and Rustichini. We show that the differences between the HMS approach and the others are mainly due to the notion of validity used and the fact that the HMS is based on a 3-valued propositional logic.