On repeated games with complete information
Mathematics of Operations Research
Verifiable secret sharing and multiparty protocols with honest majority
STOC '89 Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Perfectly secure message transmission
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Asynchronous consensus and broadcast protocols
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
International Journal of Game Theory
Reliable communication over partially authenticated networks
Theoretical Computer Science
Reaching Agreement in the Presence of Faults
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Secure Communication in an Unknown Network Using Certificates
ASIACRYPT '99 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
Reliable broadcast in unknown fixed-identity networks
Proceedings of the twenty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Efficient reliable communication over partially authenticated networks
Distributed Computing - Special issue: PODC 02
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We consider a group of players who perform tasks repeatedly. The players are nodes of a communication network and observe their neighbors' actions. Players have partial knowledge of the network and only know their set of neighbors. We study the existence of protocols for fault reporting: whenever a player chooses a faulty action, the communication protocol starts and the output publicly reveals the identity of the faulty player. We consider two setups. In the first one, players do not share authentication keys. We show that existence of a protocol for fault reporting is equivalent to the 2-vertex-connectedness of the network: no single vertex deletion disconnects the graph. In the second setup, we allow players to share authentication keys. We show that existence of a distribution of the keys and of a protocol for fault reporting is equivalent to the 2-edge-connectedness of the network: no single edge deletion disconnects the graph. We give applications to the implementation of socially optimal outcomes in repeated games.