Towards a game theoretic view of secure computation

  • Authors:
  • Gilad Asharov;Ran Canetti;Carmit Hazay

  • Affiliations:
  • Department of Computer Science, Bar-Ilan University, Israel;Department of Computer Science, Tel-Aviv University, Israel;Department of Computer Science, Aarhus University, Denmark

  • Venue:
  • EUROCRYPT'11 Proceedings of the 30th Annual international conference on Theory and applications of cryptographic techniques: advances in cryptology
  • Year:
  • 2011

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Abstract

We demonstrate how Game Theoretic concepts and formalism can be used to capture cryptographic notions of security. In the restricted but indicative case of two-party protocols in the face of malicious fail-stop faults, we first show how the traditional notions of secrecy and correctness of protocols can be captured as properties of Nash equilibria in games for rational players. Next, we concentrate on fairness. Here we demonstrate a Game Theoretic notion and two different cryptographic notions that turn out to all be equivalent. In addition, we provide a simulation based notion that implies the previous three. All four notions are weaker than existing cryptographic notions of fairness. In particular, we show that they can be met in some natural setting where existing notions of fairness are provably impossible to achieve.