Limits on the security of coin flips when half the processors are faulty
STOC '86 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Fair distribution protocols or how the players replace fortune
Mathematics of Operations Research
A Cryptographic Solution to a Game Theoretic Problem
CRYPTO '00 Proceedings of the 20th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Rational secret sharing and multiparty computation: extended abstract
STOC '04 Proceedings of the thirty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Completely fair SFE and coalition-safe cheap talk
Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Rational Secure Computation and Ideal Mechanism Design
FOCS '05 Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Proceedings of the twenty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Games for exchanging information
STOC '08 Proceedings of the fortieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
TCC '09 Proceedings of the 6th Theory of Cryptography Conference on Theory of Cryptography
Fairness with an Honest Minority and a Rational Majority
TCC '09 Proceedings of the 6th Theory of Cryptography Conference on Theory of Cryptography
Purely Rational Secret Sharing (Extended Abstract)
TCC '09 Proceedings of the 6th Theory of Cryptography Conference on Theory of Cryptography
Bridging game theory and cryptography: recent results and future directions
TCC'08 Proceedings of the 5th conference on Theory of cryptography
TCC'08 Proceedings of the 5th conference on Theory of cryptography
Cryptography and game theory: designing protocols for exchanging information
TCC'08 Proceedings of the 5th conference on Theory of cryptography
Sequential Rationality in Cryptographic Protocols
FOCS '10 Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE 51st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Utility Dependence in Correct and Fair Rational Secret Sharing
Journal of Cryptology
Towards a game theoretic view of secure computation
EUROCRYPT'11 Proceedings of the 30th Annual international conference on Theory and applications of cryptographic techniques: advances in cryptology
Complete Fairness in Secure Two-Party Computation
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Rationality in the full-information model
TCC'10 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Theory of Cryptography
Efficient rational secret sharing in standard communication networks
TCC'10 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Theory of Cryptography
Partial Fairness in Secure Two-Party Computation
Journal of Cryptology
Rational secret sharing, revisited
SCN'06 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Security and Cryptography for Networks
Rationality and adversarial behavior in multi-party computation
CRYPTO'06 Proceedings of the 26th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
Byzantine agreement with a rational adversary
ICALP'12 Proceedings of the 39th international colloquium conference on Automata, Languages, and Programming - Volume Part II
Public-Key encryption with lazy parties
SCN'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Security and Cryptography for Networks
Fairness in the presence of semi-rational parties in rational two-party secure computation
International Journal of Grid and Utility Computing
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We consider the problem of fairness in two-party computation, where this means (informally) that both parties should learn the correct output. A seminal result of Cleve (STOC 1986) shows that fairness is, in general, impossible to achieve for malicious parties. Here, we treat the parties as rational and seek to understand what can be done. Asharov et al. (Eurocrypt 2011) recently considered this problem and showed impossibility of rational fair computation for a particular function and a particular set of utilities. We observe, however, that in their setting the parties have no incentive to compute the function even in an ideal world where fairness is guaranteed. Revisiting the problem, we show that rational fair computation is possible, for arbitrary functions and utilities, as long as at least one of the parties has a strict incentive to compute the function in the ideal world. This gives a novel setting in which game-theoretic considerations can be used to circumvent an impossibility result in cryptography.