A robust noncrytographic protocol for collective coin flipping
SIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics
Coin-flipping games immune against linear-sized coalitions
SIAM Journal on Computing
Interactive hashing can simplify zero-knowledge protocol design without computational assumptions
CRYPTO '93 Proceedings of the 13th annual international cryptology conference on Advances in cryptology
Honest-verifier statistical zero-knowledge equals general statistical zero-knowledge
STOC '98 Proceedings of the thirtieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Fault-tolerant Computation in the Full Information Model
SIAM Journal on Computing
Distributed games: from mechanisms to protocols
AAAI '99/IAAI '99 Proceedings of the sixteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence and the eleventh Innovative applications of artificial intelligence conference innovative applications of artificial intelligence
Perfect information leader election in log * n+0(1) rounds
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
Distributed algorithmic mechanism design: recent results and future directions
DIALM '02 Proceedings of the 6th international workshop on Discrete algorithms and methods for mobile computing and communications
Noncryptographic Selection Protocols
FOCS '99 Proceedings of the 40th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Specification faithfulness in networks with rational nodes
Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
BAR fault tolerance for cooperative services
Proceedings of the twentieth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles
Fast leader-election protocols with bounded cheaters' edge
Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Proceedings of the twenty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Strategyproof deterministic lotteries under broadcast communication
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 3
The Round Complexity of Two-Party Random Selection
SIAM Journal on Computing
Fault Tolerance in Distributed Mechanism Design
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Fairness with an Honest Minority and a Rational Majority
TCC '09 Proceedings of the 6th Theory of Cryptography Conference on Theory of Cryptography
On strictly competitive multi-player games
AAAI'06 Proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Bridging game theory and cryptography: recent results and future directions
TCC'08 Proceedings of the 5th conference on Theory of cryptography
Rationality in the full-information model
TCC'10 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Theory of Cryptography
Random selection with an adversarial majority
CRYPTO'06 Proceedings of the 26th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
Rationality in the full-information model
TCC'10 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Theory of Cryptography
OPODIS'11 Proceedings of the 15th international conference on Principles of Distributed Systems
Fair computation with rational players
EUROCRYPT'12 Proceedings of the 31st Annual international conference on Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
Sequential rationality in cryptographic protocols
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation - Inaugural Issue
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We study rationality in protocol design for the full-information model, a model characterized by computationally unbounded adversaries, no private communication, and no simultaneity within rounds. Assuming that players derive some utility from the outcomes of an interaction, we wish to design protocols that are faithful: following the protocol should be an optimal strategy for every player, for various definitions of “optimal” and under various assumptions about the behavior of others and the presence, size, and incentives of coalitions. We first focus on leader election for players who only care about whether or not they are elected. We seek protocols that are both faithful and resilient, and for some notions of faithfulness we provide protocols, whereas for others we prove impossibility results. We then proceed to random sampling, in which the aim is for the players to jointly sample from a set of m items with a distribution that is a function of players’ preferences over them. We construct protocols for m≥3 that are faithful and resilient when players are single-minded. We also show that there are no such protocols for 2 items or for complex preferences.