A robust noncrytographic protocol for collective coin flipping
SIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics
Coin-flipping games immune against linear-sized coalitions
SIAM Journal on Computing
Fast perfection-information leader-election protocol with linear immunity
STOC '93 Proceedings of the twenty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Simple and efficient leader election in the full information model
STOC '94 Proceedings of the twenty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Fault-tolerant Computation in the Full Information Model
SIAM Journal on Computing
Randomness-optimal oblivious sampling
Proceedings of the workshop on Randomized algorithms and computation
Lower bounds for leader election and collective coin-flipping in the perfect information model
STOC '99 Proceedings of the thirty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Perfect-Information Leader Election with Optimal Resilience
SIAM Journal on Computing
Perfect information leader election in log * n+0(1) rounds
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
Noncryptographic Selection Protocols
FOCS '99 Proceedings of the 40th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Strategyproof deterministic lotteries under broadcast communication
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 3
Rationality in the full-information model
TCC'10 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Theory of Cryptography
Random selection with an adversarial majority
CRYPTO'06 Proceedings of the 26th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
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We study the leader election problem on n players in the asynchronous full-information model. Our main contention is that the most commonly used performance measure for leader-election protocols, called resilience, is unable to discern whether a small number of players can exercise disproportionate influence on the outcome of a protocol, or not. As a remedy we propose a new quantity, named cheaters' edge, which roughly describes by what multiplicative factor malicious players may increase, through cheating, their probability of getting elected. Arguably, a good protocol must have bounded cheaters' edge.We present polynomial-time constructions of new leader-election protocols that are fast, in terms of the rounds required (5, 5 log n, and log n rounds, respectively), but moreover exhibit bounded cheaters' edge under progressively looser restrictions on the number t of malicious players: t a priori knowledge of t. The latter of these three protocols constitutes the first constructive solution to a problem posed by Alon and Naor more than a decade ago.