Universal one-way hash functions and their cryptographic applications
STOC '89 Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
On the existence of statistically hiding bit commitment schemes and fail-stop signatures
CRYPTO '93 Proceedings of the 13th annual international cryptology conference on Advances in cryptology
Foundations of Cryptography: Basic Tools
Foundations of Cryptography: Basic Tools
A Cryptographic Solution to a Game Theoretic Problem
CRYPTO '00 Proceedings of the 20th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Rational secret sharing and multiparty computation: extended abstract
STOC '04 Proceedings of the thirty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Rational Secure Computation and Ideal Mechanism Design
FOCS '05 Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Proceedings of the twenty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Statistically-hiding commitment from any one-way function
Proceedings of the thirty-ninth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Games for exchanging information
STOC '08 Proceedings of the fortieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
How to simultaneously exchange a secret bit by flipping a symmetrically-biased coin
SFCS '83 Proceedings of the 24th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Fairness with an Honest Minority and a Rational Majority
TCC '09 Proceedings of the 6th Theory of Cryptography Conference on Theory of Cryptography
Purely Rational Secret Sharing (Extended Abstract)
TCC '09 Proceedings of the 6th Theory of Cryptography Conference on Theory of Cryptography
Utility Dependence in Correct and Fair Rational Secret Sharing
CRYPTO '09 Proceedings of the 29th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Security Against Covert Adversaries: Efficient Protocols for Realistic Adversaries
Journal of Cryptology
Bridging game theory and cryptography: recent results and future directions
TCC'08 Proceedings of the 5th conference on Theory of cryptography
Cryptography and game theory: designing protocols for exchanging information
TCC'08 Proceedings of the 5th conference on Theory of cryptography
Rationality in the full-information model
TCC'10 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Theory of Cryptography
Efficient rational secret sharing in standard communication networks
TCC'10 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Theory of Cryptography
Rational secret sharing, revisited
SCN'06 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Security and Cryptography for Networks
Rationality and adversarial behavior in multi-party computation
CRYPTO'06 Proceedings of the 26th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
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Much of the literature on rational cryptography focuses on analyzing the strategic properties of cryptographic protocols. However, due to the presence of computationally-bounded players and the asymptotic nature of cryptographic security, a definition of sequential rationality for this setting has thus far eluded researchers. We propose a new framework for overcoming these obstacles, and provide the first definitions of computational solution concepts that guarantee sequential rationality. We argue that natural computational variants of subgame perfection are too strong for cryptographic protocols. As an alternative, we introduce a weakening called threat-free Nash equilibrium that is more permissive but still eliminates the undesirable “empty threats” of nonsequential solution concepts. To demonstrate the applicability of our framework, we revisit the problem of implementing a mediator for correlated equilibria [Dodis et al 2000], and propose a variant of their protocol that is sequentially rational for a nontrivial class of correlated equilibria. Our treatment provides a better understanding of the conditions under which mediators in a correlated equilibrium can be replaced by a stable protocol.