Conditionally-perfect secrecy and a provably-secure randomized cipher
Journal of Cryptology - Eurocrypt '90
Unconditional security in quantum cryptography
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Quantum computation and quantum information
Quantum computation and quantum information
Authentication of Quantum Messages
FOCS '02 Proceedings of the 43rd Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Hyper-Encryption and Everlasting Security
STACS '02 Proceedings of the 19th Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science
Information Theoretically Secure Communication in the Limited Storage Space Model
CRYPTO '99 Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
FOCS '00 Proceedings of the 41st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Efficient Quantum Key Distribution Scheme and a Proof of Its Unconditional Security
Journal of Cryptology
Proof of security of quantum key distribution with two-way classical communications
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
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Quantum states cannot be cloned. I show how to extend this property to classical messages encoded using quantum states, a task I call "uncloneable encryption." An uncloneable encryption scheme has the property that an eavesdropper Eve not only cannot read the encrypted message, but she cannot copy it down for later decoding. She could steal it, but then the receiver Bob would not receive the message, and would thus be alerted that something was amiss. I prove that any authentication scheme for quantum states acts as a secure uncloneable encryption scheme. Uncloneable encryption is also closely related to quantum key distribution (QKD), demonstrating a close connection between cryptographic tasks for quantum states and for classical messages. Thus, studying uncloneable encryption and quantum authentication allows for some modest improvements in QKD protocols. While the main results apply to a one-time key with unconditional security, I also show uncloneable encryption remains secure with a pseudorandom key. In this case, to defeat the scheme, Eve must break the computational assumption behind the pseudorandom sequence before Bob receives the message, or her opportunity is lost. This means uncloneable encryption can be used in a non-interactive setting, where QKD is not available, allowing Alice and Bob to convert a temporary computational assumption into a permanently secure message.