A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems
Communications of the ACM
On the Generation of Cryptographically Strong Pseudo-Random Sequences
Proceedings of the 8th Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming
On the cryptographic security of single RSA bits
STOC '83 Proceedings of the fifteenth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
DIGITALIZED SIGNATURES AND PUBLIC-KEY FUNCTIONS AS INTRACTABLE AS FACTORIZATION
DIGITALIZED SIGNATURES AND PUBLIC-KEY FUNCTIONS AS INTRACTABLE AS FACTORIZATION
How to generate cryptographically strong sequences of pseudo random bits
SFCS '82 Proceedings of the 23rd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Why and how to establish a private code on a public network
SFCS '82 Proceedings of the 23rd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Theory and application of trapdoor functions
SFCS '82 Proceedings of the 23rd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
RSA/Rabin least significant bits are 1-2- + 1/poly(log N) secure
Proceedings of CRYPTO 84 on Advances in cryptology
The security of all RSA and discrete log bits
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
| Hi-index | 0.03 |
We prove by some novel sampling techniques that the least significant bits of RSA-messages are 0.5+ 驴 - secure. Any oracle which correctly predicts the k-th least significant message bit for at least a 0.5 + 驴 - fraction of all messages can be used to decipher all RSA ciphertexts in random polynomial time (more precisely in time (log n)0(驴-2+k)).